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ABSTRACT 
Distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks have emerged as a prevalent way to compromise the availability of 
networks/servers, which imposed financial losses for e-commerce businesses.  Many defenses that mitigate the effect of ongoing 
DDOS attacks have been proposed.  However, none of the defenses have been widely deployed on the Internet infrastructure at 
this point because of a lack of understanding in the economic incentives inherent in providing the defenses as well as uncertainty 
in current defenses.  We propose that ISPs should provide DDOS defenses as network services to ensure the availability of a 
network or a server when the technology is ready.  This paper provides an analytical framework for the proposed service to align 
the economic incentives.  Using empirical data from security incidents, this paper shows that the proposed service can bring 
economic benefits to providers with an appropriate pricing strategy, some investigation into the expected loss of subscribers, and 
knowledge on the overall risk level of attacks. 
KEYWORDS 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Network distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks (Houle and Weaver 2001) compromise the availability of victims’ 
networks or servers. Past incidents have caused financial losses of victims (Garber 2000; Tran 2000; Yankee 2000). Many 
defenses that mitigate the effect of ongoing DDOS attacks have been proposed and the uncertainty inherent in the technology 
has been previously studied (Lipson 2002; Mirkovic 2002; Chen et al. 2003). Currently, although some ISPs have developed 
methods to trace the sources of attack traffic on their backbone networks (Snoeren  et al 2001, 2002; Stone 2000), automatic 
mechanisms on responding against ongoing attack traffic is still underdeveloped in practice. More research effort is still needed 
to develop the automatic responses. Our purpose here is to assess if any economic incentive would push ISPs towards the 
development of the automatic mechanisms so that ISPs will further provide them to their subscribers. This problem is not just 
technical but is a management and policy problem as well, involving the setting of policies and meeting the needs of diverse 
subscribers with different priorities. 
What would be the economic incentives of ISPs to provide defenses against network attacks such as DDOS? This paper is 
intended to address this question by analyzing the economic benefits and costs of ISPs to provide the defenses at some choke 
points of the Internet infrastructure, such as network routers/proxy servers. We propose that ISPs should provide network 
defenses as network security services to their subscribers. Network security services, such as Virtual Private Networks or 
firewalls, have been provided by ISPs as optional network services to deal with the secrecy of data transportation.  In this case, 
the services that provide DDOS defenses ensure the availability of a network or a server during attacks. 
We developed an analytical model to quantify the benefits and costs of the service provision. The model considers both the 
demand of subscribers (potential attack victims/sources) and the supply of the providers (ISPs) to deploy the network defenses. 
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We analyzed the model analytically and calibrated some parameters using empirical data on network attacks. Based on these 
results, we provide recommendations on aligning ISPs’ economic incentives.  
The next section introduces the proposed service and describes the analytical model. Section 3 describes the analytical results 
from the model. Section 4 describes the empirical calibration and Section 5 discusses the model results. Conclusions and future 
works follow. 
2. THE ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR THE PROVISION OF NETWORK SECURITY SERVICES 
We propose that ISPs provide network security services to their subscribers. The services deploy DDOS defenses on some choke 
points of the Internet infrastructure and react actively to filter DDOS attack traffic during attacks. We consider two types of 
DDOS defenses: source filtering and destination filtering. Source filtering refers to the defenses that monitor the outbound traffic 
from a subscriber in order to prevent the subscriber from originating attacks (attack source). Destination filtering refers to the 
defenses that monitor the inbound traffic to a subscriber in order to prevent the subscriber from being attacked (attack victim). A 
detail description of the current technologies is in (Chen et al. 2003). We define our analytical model based on the following 
assumptions: 
• Attacks: DDOS attacks saturate the network connections of subscribers to their backbone networks or take down servers 
inside the network of the subscribers. The attacks can be traced to their sources within the administrative boundary of one 
network provider.  
• Subscribers: Subscribers would pay based on the utility received from the defense. The utility that a subscriber derives from 
DDOS defenses is the expected loss that would be incurred from DDOS attacks.  
• Providers: Providers would offer the service to an additional subscriber when the marginal benefit to the provider is larger 
than the marginal cost to the provider. 
• Pricing: Providers charge all subscribers at a flat rate for a certain time period for the security service, such as a month. 
Many ISPs such as AOL currently offer virus scanning and firewall at a flat rate in additional to the network connection 
service that they provide.  We will vary this assumption and analyze other pricing schemes in Section 5. 
• Market: The service is offered in a competitive market where the price for the service is determined so that the number of 
subscribers that are willing to subscribe it is equal to the number of subscribers that the provider would like to offer it. We 
will discuss the service provision in a monopoly market in Section 5. 
2.1 Benefits and Costs of Subscribers 
What a subscriber is willing to pay for DDOS defenses is assumed to be less than the utility received from the security service. 
We use a linear function to quantify the utility. A similar linear function form has been used to quantify the expected loss 
associated with the information set being compromised in an attack (Gordon and Loeb 2002) and the utility of subscribers for 
intermediary services (Bhargava, Choudhary et al. 2000) and digital goods (Bhargava and Choudhary 2001). 
The utility that a subscriber derives from DDOS defenses is the expected loss that would be incurred from DDOS attacks.  
Economic losses from Internet security breaches have been studied previously (Cavusoglu et al. 2002; Ettredge and Richardson 
2002). The expected loss is quantified by three factors:  the attack frequency, a∈ [0,1], referring to how often attacks occur,  the 
expected loss per attack, L, referring to how much loss an attack imposes on the subscriber and the quality of the defense, q∈ 
[0,1], quantifying the impact of the performance efficiency on the expected loss. Let U denote the utility function of a subscriber 
for the service, which is defined as: 
aqLU =                                                                   (1.a). 
Consider a simplifying situation that only one type of service is offered and the provider charges each subscriber a flat rate p for 
a certain time period, such as a month. Based on the assumption that a subscriber is willing to pay less than the utility, the upper 
bound for the service charge pd is: 
aqLPd ≤                                                                      (1.b). 
Assume that L for all subscribers is proportional to a uniform distribution. Let q denote the quality of the service for DDOS 
defenses, which can be considered as a network performance measure, such as the arrival rate of legitimate traffic. The number 
of subscribers that will subscribe to the service depends on the distribution of a.  F(a) denotes the percentage of the subscribers 
that have at least a attacks, and assume that L and a are independent. As a result, only the subscribers that expect the attack 
frequency to be larger than 
dP
qL  would subscribe to the service at .  Let M represent the total number of subscribers of an ISP. dP
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Let Nd denote the number of subscribers that are willing to subscribe to the network security service. When the price is set at , 
N
dP
d is calculated as: 
MaFNd )(=                                                             (1.c). 
From (1.c), the lowest attack frequency expected by the subscribers of the network security service is a function of Nd, which is: 
)()( 1
M
NFaNK dd
−
==                                                          (1.d). 
2.2 Benefits and Costs of Providers 
The cost quantification considers only the operational cost of providing DDOS defenses but not the capital investment on the 
infrastructure. Three factors are considered in quantifying the operational cost. They are: 1) fixed cost (Co), 2) filter overhead 
(R), and 3) bandwidth saving (W). Both R and W quantify the per-attack operating cost while Co quantifies the per-subscriber 
operating cost. Fixed cost (Co) quantifies the additional cost per subscriber that the provider has to pay in order to set up the 
service for the subscriber. For example, the cost of additional equipment, such as disk space for logging, or additional 
administrative overhead. Filter overhead (R) quantifies the per-attack overhead of a defense on IP transport due to attack 
detection and responses. If the provider provides an IP transport service that guarantees a certain quality of service (QoS), the 
additional overhead imposes an economic cost to the provider. On the contrary, bandwidth saving (W) reduces the cost, which 
quantifies the per-attack transport benefit. This benefit comes from filtering attack packets before they are transported to their 
destinations.  
Filter overhead per attack R is defined to be proportional to the number of filters H(G), the link utilization by legitimate traffic 
µx, and the attack duration τ.  Given a network topology G, H(G) is calculated as the number of edges monitored by filters, 
which are deployed between attack sources and victims. H(G) is influenced by the network topology because filters must be 
deployed at some choke points between the attack sources and the victims. The model assumes that filters are triggered only 
when attacks are detected and that the proportional relationship is linear. Cr denotes the unit economic cost of filter overhead and 
S denotes the number of attack sources, R is defined as: 
)(GHCR rxτµ=                                                          (2.a). 
Bandwidth saving per attack W is defined to be proportional to transport distance saved D(G), the link utilization by attack 
traffic µa, and the attack duration τ.  D(G) is calculated as the transport distance between filters and the victim networks, which 
is also topology dependent. fa denotes the attack traffic filtering rate and Cw denotes the unit economic cost of bandwidth. W(G) 
is defined as: 
),( awa fGDCW τµ=                                                   (2.b). 
The total cost of providing the defense C is the sum of operational cost Co from all subscribers, and R from all attacks. Let 
 represent the total number of attacks from all subscribers of the service, which is equal to ∑  where a)( sNΘ
=
N
i
ia
1
i is the attack 
frequency of ith subscriber. When the service is offered to Ns subscribers, the total cost for providing the service is calculated as: 
 )( sso NRNCC Θ+=                                                    (2.c). 
The total benefit for providing the service is calculated as: 
)( sss NWNPB Θ+=                                                     (2.d). 
The total profit for providing the services TP is:  
sosss NCNRWNPCBTP −Θ−+=−= )()(                                    (2.e). 
By setting 0=
sdN
dTP , the lower bound of the service charge (the marginal cost of providing the service to one additional 
subscriber) is: 
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)(][ sos NKWRCP −+≥                                                                 (2.f). 
3. ANALYTICAL RESULTS 
From (1.a)-(1.d) and (2.a)-(2.f), the price range of the security service obtained is the following: 
qLnKpnKWRCo )()(][ ≤≤−+     (3.a) 
How a provider sets the price within this range depends on the market (its competitors) and its pricing strategy. In the short term, 
if all providers have the same marginal cost, the equilibrium price and the equilibrium number of subscribers in a competitive 
market can be calculated by equaling (3.b) and (3.c). The equilibrium number of subscriber n* will satisfy  
0)(][ * =−−+ nKqLWRCo      (3.b). 
The equilibrium price is 
)(][)( *** nKWRCqLnKp o −+==     (3.c). 
The total provider’s benefit is equal to its profit, which is  
*** )(][ nCnWRnpTP o−Θ−−=      (3.d). 
The total subscribers’ benefit is  
**)( npnqLCS −Θ=       (3.e). 
The total social benefit is  
*)(][ nCnWRqLCSTPSB o−Θ+−=+=     (3.f). 
Table 1 lists the impact of each variable on TP, CS and SB. We summarized two major findings as follows: 
1) When the capacity of the network is constrained, providers have more benefits over costs of providing defense mechanisms 
using flat rate pricing. When the capacity of the ISP’s network is constrained, the bandwidth saving is larger than the filter 
overhead (R<W). During a DDOS attack, an ISP’s network capacity can be constrained because attackers intend to cause 
burst traffic. Even if the ISP expands its network capacity, attackers can still generate attacks with increasingly higher 
packet rates. In this case, all TP, CS and SB increase with bandwidth saving and decrease with filter overhead so that the 
provider’s interest is aligned with the subscribers’ interests. 
2) When the capacity of the network is not constrained, providers have more costs over benefits of providing defense 
mechanisms using flat rate pricing in a competitive market. In this case, other pricing strategies should be considered. 
When the capacity of the ISP’s network is not constrained, the bandwidth saving is larger than filter over head (R>W). In 
this case, providers have losses from providing the defense mechanisms because the flat rate price cannot fully recover the 
cost. Subscribers that have low probability of being attacked will not pay for the service because they simply expect less 
loss from the attacks than the service fee. Under this circumstance, the providers should consider other pricing strategies.  
 
 
Variables R=W  (TP=0) R<W  (TP>0) R>W  (TP<0) 
Name Increase in TP CS SB TP CS SB TP CS SB 
Operational cost Co 0 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ 
Reduced expected loss L,q 0 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ 
Router overhead R(µ, Cr, H) 0 ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ 
Bandwidth saving W(A, Cw, D) 0 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ 
Attack duration τ 0 0 0 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ 
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Table 1: The impacts1 of variables on provider’ benefit, subscribers’ benefit and social benefit 
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR PARAMETER CALIBRATIONS 
We estimated the variation of the demand among individual subscribers using empirical data of network attacks. The variation 
can be explained as the variation in the attack risk of subscribers’ online services. For example, the demand for the service from 
an e-commerce web site such as Yahoo or eBay is higher than a personal web site since the probability of attacks to an e-
commerce web site is greater. 
We used two data sets to calibrate the probability of attacks F(a) since F(a) determines the shape of the demand function.  These 
two empirical data sets are: 1) the DDOS data set (Moore et al. 2001) and 2) the Code-Red data set (Moore 2001). The DDOS 
data set is used to estimate the distribution of attacks “sent to” subscribers (for destination filtering), and the Code-Red data set is 
used to estimate the distribution of attacks “originating from” subscribers (for source filtering).  Figure 1 shows that both data 
sets can be modeled by a power curve functional form (R-square = 0.93 and 0.98, respectively). We will use the two estimated 
functional form to calibrate F(a) in the next section. 
Figure 1: The empirical data of network attacks 
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1 “0” denotes no influence, “↓” denotes an increase on the parameter will decrease TP, CS or SB, and “↑” denotes an increase on the parameter 
will increase TP, CS or SB. 
We calculated R and W using an AT&T backbone network map from (BW 2001). This map describes a core network topology 
connecting North America cities for AT&T network. In addition, we collected public available data to calibrate parameters of a 
base scenario (Table 2). In the next section, the parameters for the model analysis are set to the values in this base scenario 
unless they are otherwise specified. This base scenario assumes a TCP SYN attack launched at an average packet rate based on 
data observed from single attack source. Destination filtering is deployed to monitor the inbound traffic to subscribers (victims). 
The unit bandwidth cost is equal to unit filter overhead because this case assumes that the overhead imposed by filtering a packet 
is equal to the overhead of forwarding a packet.  A detail description of the data sets and the topology calculation is in (Chen 
2003). 
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5. COST AND BENEFIT ANALYSIS BASED ON EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The empirical calibration is to clarify three issues that can not be determined by the analytical results alone.  1) When the 
capacity of the network is constrained, how do we choose from different defense technologies? 2) What are the factors that 
influence the capacity constraint during an attack? 3) If the flat rate pricing cannot support the security services, what are the 
alternatives? Each of the following sub-sections will address each of the three questions, respectively.  To avoid presenting 
absolute monetary values of the benefits and costs, we will use a benefit-cost ratio (
C
B ) to present the empirical results.  
5.1 Filtering Technology 
What defense technologies that a network provider should adopt when bandwidth cost is a concern of the operation?  Here we 
discuss two types of technologies: 1) destination filtering: filtering inbound traffic of subscribers to prevent the subscribers from 
being attacked, and 2) source filtering: filtering outbound traffic of subscribers to prevent the subscribers from sending out attack 
traffic.  We used the DDOS data to calibrate the demand for destination filtering and the Code-Red data to calibrate the demand 
for source filtering. 
When destination filtering is deployed, the closer the filters can be to the attack sources, the more benefit both the provider and 
the subscriber will have. Figure 2 shows that both the provider’s benefit and the subscribers’ benefit increases when the filter 
location2 is closer to the attack source. The provider gains from the increase of the bandwidth saving because attack traffic has 
been filtered out before it is transported. The subscribers also benefit from an increase in the quality of the service. That is, more 
legitimate traffic to the subscribers can bypass the filters.  
Some subscribers may be exploited by attackers to launch attacks. When subscribers suffer losses from originating attacks, the 
network provider will be better off to adopt source filtering than destination filtering.  This result occurs when the packet rate of 
an attack is larger than a threshold, 150pps for our scenario (Figure 3).  This point is where the network capacity is constrained 
(W>R) as we discussed in Section 3.  This result implies that a policy is needed to impose a cost on subscribers that originate 
attacks. Possible ways of imposing such a cost include blacklisting the subscribers that originate attacks, assigning liability to 
attack sources (Kabay 2001), or revealing the origins of the attack sources. 
5.2 Capacity Constraints 
What is the impact of other factors on the network capacity constraints? Here we discuss two factors in our model: the ratio of 
bandwidth cost and filter overhead and the distribution of attacks sources.   
First, the network capacity becomes constrained when the unit bandwidth cost is 10 times of the unit filter overhead.  In this 
case, source filtering is more beneficial for the provider. Figure 4 shows that the benefit cost ratio in source filtering exceeds it in 
destination filtering when Cw/Cr >0.1.   
Second, the packet rate for the capacity constraint increases when the number of attack sources increases and when the attack 
sources are distributed.  As in Figure 5, when the packet rate < 3000pps, the benefit-cost ratio for the source filtering data set is 
smaller than it for the destination filtering.  When the packet rate > 3000pps, the difference of the benefit-cost ratio between the 
two approaches is much smaller than it is during a single source attack. This reason for the result is that, for a given packet rate 
of an attack received by the victim, the packet rate from one attack source when the attack is distributed is less than the packet 
rate from one attack source when the attack is from one source. 
                                                 
2 Attack upstream means the filter is set at one hop upstream of the network that originates attacks. Victim upstream means the filter is set at 
the access router to the victim’s network.  
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Figure 2: Increase on both the provider’s benefit and subscribers’ benefit by setting filters 
closer to the attack sources 
Figure 3: Benefit-cost ratio per service for source filtering and destination filtering  
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Figure 4: The impact of bandwidth cost/filter overhead cost 
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+00
1.E+01
1.E+02
1.E+03
1.E+04
1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000
packet rate of the attack to the victim (pps)
be
ne
fit
-c
os
t r
at
io
destinaton filtering, single
destination filtering, distributed
source filtering, single
source filetring, distributed
Figure 5: Single source attacks vs distributed source attacks  
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5.3 Pricing Strategies 
The advantage of the flat rate pricing scheme is its simplicity. However, under such a scheme, the provider will not have 
incentives to provide the service if the network is not capacity constrained. We will relax this flat rate assumption in this section. 
For comparison, we analyzed two other strategies: 1) free bundling and 2) differential pricing.   
We will discuss the free bundling pricing scheme using the benefit-cost ratio per attack, which represents how much benefit over 
cost that an ISP would obtain without considering the payment and the fixed cost from each subscriber.  This situation happens 
when providers would like to attract more subscribers to the IP transport service or when providers charge the subscribers for 
only the fixed cost per subscriber.  Using source filtering (Figure 6) as an example, the flat rate pricing scheme has the 
approximately same benefit-cost ratio as the free bundling scheme if the fixed cost is covered from other services.  The reason 
for this is that the number of attack frequency is very large in our Code-Red data set so that the benefit per attack is much larger 
than the benefit from subscription charge. In this case, the impact of the price is negligible. In addition, if the benefit from 
network connection services is larger than the fixed cost, the free bundling scheme is even more beneficial for the provider than 
the flat rate scheme since the provider obtain both the bandwidth saving and the additional gains from other services.  
An alternative pricing scheme should be provided under the monopoly market. A possible pricing scheme is to charge 
subscribers differently based on their individual utility from the service (as equation 1.a). However, the individual utility of the 
service could be hard to calculate in practice. An alternative is to differentiate the service to several versions for subscribers who 
have different expected loss. Similar schemes have been used in digital product vertical differentiation (Bhargava and 
Choudhary 2001).  Figure 7 compares the flat rate pricing scheme and the differential pricing scheme for individual subscribers. 
The differential pricing considers an extreme case that the provider can price the subscribers based on their individual utility, 
which is determined by their expected loss and the attack frequency.  Across all packet rates, the differential pricing scheme is 
more beneficial for the provider than the flat rate scheme. The analysis on the differential pricing here is preliminary.  Further 
mechanisms are needed for aligning subscribers with different prices since it is hard in practice to evaluate the expected loss of 
subscribers. 
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Figure 6: Benefit-cost ratio per service vs benefit-cost ratio 
per attack for source filtering at the upstream router of attack sources 
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Figure 7: Differential pricing vs flat rate pricing in the monopoly market for source filtering  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We proposed a quantitative method to investigate the economic incentives for providing services to response against ongoing 
DDOS attack traffic. To introduce the new service for their subscribers, network providers need to ensure that the operational 
profit in the long term would justify their capital investment.  We found several factors that will influence the operational profit.   
At the initial stage, when few providers are able to deploy the service (monopoly market), the providers should implement a 
differential pricing scheme. By doing this, the provider can benefit from the different levels of expected loss experienced by 
subscribers and from the different levels of the attack frequency. When more and more providers are able to provide the service 
(competitive market), no single provider can benefit from the differential pricing scheme since subscribers can have more 
choices by switching to another provider. In this case, three implications can be drawn: 
1) Setting the filter location closer to the attack source is more beneficial than closer to the victim network for both the 
subscribers and the providers. This result is more significant when the network of the provider is capacity constrained. 
2) Providing source filtering is better for a provider than providing destination filtering when most attacks to its subscribers 
are launched at high packet rates and when subscribers that originate attacks suffer losses.  
3) The provider is better off providing the destination filtering service for free if the fixed cost per subscribers can be 
recovered from the additional income from additional subscribers to network transport services. 
We provided an analysis on the economic incentives of providing DDOS defenses. With an appropriate pricing strategy and 
some investigation into the expected loss from attacks, network providers can benefit from providing the security services and 
align their interests with subscribers.  This work is just our first step to investigate this problem.  Future work on estimating 
subscribers’ expected loss and collecting data on attack incidents are needed to facilitate our proposal. 
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